In this paper, we investigated whether civil wars in Africa have economic and political causes. The model is based on the Collier-Hoeffler "greed" and "grievance" theory in which rebels will conduct a civil war for "loot-seeking" and "justiceseeking" reasons. Using logit models the propositions were tested empirically. In particular six variables -GDP per capita growth rate in the preceding period, the amount of natural resources (proxied by primary commodity exports-GDP ratio), peace duration, democracy, social fractionalisation, and population size -are significant and strong determinants of the onset of civil wars in Africa. The policy implication is the combination of economic diversification, poverty and population reduction, and political reforms so as to prevent conflict situations in African countries. 
2 period, 1960-1999. Our main interest is to explore the impact of economic and political variables on civil war outbreak in Africa and from there propose domestic and international policies to effectively prevent civil wars in Africa.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the theory of civil war onset and outlines our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our methodology and data. Section 4 presents our findings. Section 5 concludes with some of the policy implications of our analysis.
The Theory Of Civil War Outbreak
Collier 12, 13, 14 and Collier and Hoeffler 15, 16 distinguished between two possible motives for civil war: "justice-seeking" and "loot-seeking". In more recent papers, Collier and Hoeffler 17, 18, 19 have re-examined these motivations, referring to them as "greed" and "grievance."
Greed is used here as a desire for private gain. It is argued that the existence of a "lootable" resource base is both a motive for rebellion and a facilitating factor. Rebels have an incentive to challenge governments because of private gain, which is a function of opportunities foregone by engaging in violence and the availability of lootable income, which is the payoff for successfully engaging in rebellion. But greed is explained by atypical opportunities, being one of the chief conditions for profitseeking, rebel organizations to exist. Collier and Hoeffler's main proxy for greed is the ratio of primary commodity exports to gross domestic product (GDP) and is seen 11 Sørli Mirjam E. (2002) , "Resources, Regimes and Rebellion", International Peace Research 3 as offering the opportunity for extortion, which helps to finance war. Thus, they argue that the risk of civil war initiation increases as the natural resource endowment increases and decreases as the opportunity cost of rebellion increases. 1 9 6 0 -6 4 1 9 6 5 -6 9 1 9 7 0 -7 4 1 9 7 5 -7 9 1 9 8 0 -8 4 1 9 8 5 -8 9 1 9 9 0 -9 4 1 9 9 5 -9 9
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However, following Le Billon's typology of natural resources into geographical location ('proximate" or 'distant' to capital) and the geographical concentration ('proximate' or 'diffuse'), Sorli considered Collier and Hoeffler's use of primary commodity dependence as lumpy. Sorli had therefore suggested and used (for the Middle East and North Africa) a break down of primary commodity dependence into mineral and oil dependence. In particular, it is argued that the unique technology, infrastructure and the dominant role of oil in the international commodity market, in addition to its influence on economic and political development, justifies this dichotomy. Our estimation with this dichotomy showed that the dichotomy was not important for Africa hence it was dropped.
can be proxied by mean income per capita, male secondary schooling, and the growth rate of the economy in the preceding period (representing new income opportunities).
Collier and Hoeffler point to another dimension of opportunity -weak government military capability. 20 Thus, while forests and mountains provide rebels with a safe haven, geographical dispersion of the population may inhibit government capability.
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Another source of rebel military opportunity is social cohesion -ethnic and religious diversity within a country tends to reduce their ability to function. Thus, an ethnically diverse society may reduce the opportunity for rebellion by limiting the recruitment pool. This is usually measured by the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation.
Rebellions may also be caused by grievance and may aim at achieving justice. The demand versus supply of justice determines the conditions for the onset of "justice- rates. This result is consistent with evidence that the lower the rate of growth is; the higher is the probability of unconstitutional political change. 33 The descriptive statistics also give support to the opportunity cost hypothesis: conflict episodes were on average more dependent upon primary commodity exports (and its squared term) than the peace episodes. This indicates that increases in war outbreak were partly due to rebel responses to financial opportunities in Africa contrary to the findings of Collier and Hoeffler.
Empirical Results And Tests Of Our Hypotheses
Descriptive Statistics
As predicted by theory, the descriptive data support the thesis that peace duration reduces grievance and war episodes. Also, data supports the thesis that democracy reduces the probability of war outbreak: minimum democracy (and its squared term) was substantially larger (almost double) in peace episodes. In the same way, transition was larger in peace episodes. However, the descriptive data suggests that social fractionalisation is important: war episodes have higher mean values. This rejects the thesis that social cohesion enhances opportunity. On the other hand, ethnic dominance is more common in peace episodes than in war episodes.
With respect to demographic variables, the descriptive data shows that war episodes in Africa had markedly larger populations than the peace episodes. Table 1 indicates that the concentration of the population is as common in peace episodes as 33 Alesina A. and S. Oetzler and N. Roubini, and P. Swagel (1996) , "Political Instability and Economic 
Regression Results and Tests of Hypotheses
Our estimation results are presented in Table 2 , with column 1 as our baseline result.
We first turn to the economic variables. The risk of onset of civil war is positively but non-significantly associated with per capita income. This partly fails to lend support to the Collier-Hoeffler economic theory of civil war. However, the other proxy for earnings forgone -economic growth rate in the preceding period -is robustly and negatively associated with war onset in Africa. An additional percentage point on the growth rate reduces the risk of war by about two percentage points.
As in Sorli and Collier-Hoeffler we find that the presence of natural resources (proxied by primary exports-GDP ratio) seems to provide easily "lootable" assets for "loot-seeking" rebels or convenient sources of support of "justice-seeking" movements as expoused by Collier. Thus, while we accept the hypothesis that economic development is significantly associated with the onset of civil war in Africa, we note that higher economic growth significantly reduces civil war while dependence on, or the availability of, natural resources increases the risk of war onset in the Continent. We note also that it is not the level of per capita income per se that leads to war outbreak in Africa.
Democracy is clearly significant and negatively associated with civil war onset in Africa. This supports the findings of Elbadawi and Sambanis, Ellingsen et al, 34 and
Sorli but contradicts the findings of Collier and Hoeffler. In our results, democracy is shown to be an important explanatory variable, and gives strength to a more traditional "grievance-based" and liberal peace-rooted explanation of civil war. Thus, we accept the hypothesis that democracy reduces the onset of civil war in Africa.
Also, in accordance with political theory, peace duration is significantly and negatively associated with civil war in Africa. In addition, social fractionalisation significantly reduces the risk of civil war outbreak. This means that cohesion is important for rebel effectiveness hence social fractionalisation makes a society 9 substantially safer. This accords with the reality in Africa, which is characterised by high degree of religious and ethnic fractionalisation. Thus, we accept the hypothesis that ethnic fractionalisation is significantly and negatively associated with civil war onset in Africa. The non-significance of the positive association between ethnic dominance and civil war in Africa arises because fewer African societies are characterised by ethnic dominance.
The coefficient of the size of the population is highly significant and positively associated with civil war and unity. This suggests that risk is proportional to size. We also find that the Sub-Saharan African dummy coefficient is significant only at 15 percent significance level and positively associated with civil war. 
Conclusion And Policy Implications
We have investigated whether civil wars in Africa have economic and political causes. The model used is based on the Collier-Hoeffler "greed" and "grievance" theory in which rebels will conduct a civil war for "loot-seeking" and "justiceseeking" reasons. Using logit models the propositions were tested empirically. In particular, six variables -GDP per capita growth rate in the preceding period, the amount of natural resources (proxied by primary commodity exports-GDP ratio), peace duration, democracy, social fractionalisation, and population size -are significant and strong determinants of the onset of civil wars in Africa.
These results are guideposts for policy to reduce civil war onset in Africa. First, African countries and their development partners need to take measures to accelerate economic growth given that rapid economic growth will gradually make rebel recruitment harder. However, given that such high growth rates cannot be realised without external assistance, it is imperative that Africa's development partners and the international community as a whole increase aid to the Continent. This is particularly so because it has been shown that aid is effective in accelerating economic growth.
Second, the international community should take measures (including appropriate sanctions) to make it more difficult for rebel organisations to sell the commodities (such as conflict diamonds) that they loot. Third, African countries need to diversify their economies away from dependence upon primary commodity exports.
Appropriate economic reforms and policies would therefore be imperative in this direction. 35 Fourth, to make loot-seeking rebels unpopular, African governments should transparently use revenues from primary commodity exports to finance effective basic social services, including education and health.
However, economic development must be complemented by political development and liberalisation to attain an amplified effect. The pace of political reforms toward better governance and improved political rights should be accelerated in Africa given that our results have shown that democracy is a useful tool to reduce the onset of civil war in the Continent. African countries may also need to check population increase through a combination of economic and social as well as medical tools given the finding that the risk of civil war is proportional to the size of the population. , 1960-64, 1965-70, ..., 1995-99 . Thus, it provides 1288 potential observations.
War starts
The war start variable takes a value of one if a civil war started during the period and zero if the country is at peace. If a war started in period t and continues in t+1 we record the value of the war started value as missing. A civil war is defined as an internal conflict in which at least 1000 battle related deaths (civilian and military) occurred per year. We use mainly the data collected by Singer and Small 38,39 and according to their definitions Nicholas Sambanis updated their data set for 1992-99.
GDP per capita
We measure income as real PPP adjusted GDP per capita. The primary data set is the Penn
World Tables 5.6 . Since the data is only available from 1960-92 we used the growth rates of real PPP adjusted GDP per capita data from the World Bank's World Development
Indicators 1998 in order to obtain income data for 1995. Income data is measured at the beginning of each sub-period, 1965, 1970, ..., 1995. (GDP growth) t-1
Using the above income per capita measure we calculated the average annual growth rate as a proxy of economic opportunities. This variable is measured in the previous five-year period. The ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP proxies the abundance of natural resources. The data on primary commodity exports as well as GDP was obtained from the World Bank. Export and GDP data are measured in current US dollars. The data is measured at the beginning of each sub-period, 1965, 1970, ...,1995 .
Primary commodity exports/GDP
Population
Population measures the total population; the data source is the World Bank's World Development Indicators 1998. Again, we measure population at the beginning of each sub-period.
Social fractionalization
We proxy social fractionalisation in a combined measure of ethnic and religious homogenous but religiously diverse, or vice versa. Evidence shows that this aggregation rule is superior to variants.
Ethnic dominance (45-90%)
Using the ethno-linguistic data from the original data source we calculated an indicator of ethnic dominance. This variable takes the value of one if one single ethno-linguistic group makes up 45 to 90 percent of the total population and zero otherwise.
Geographic Dispersion
We constructed a dispersion index of the population on a country-by-country basis. Based on population data for 400km 2 cells we generated a Gini coefficient of population dispersion for each country. A value of 0 indicates that the population is evenly distributed across the country and a value of 1 indicates that the total population is concentrated in one area. Data is available for 1990 and 1995. For years prior to 1990 we used the 1990 data.
Peace Duration
This variable measures the length of the peace period since the end of the previous civil war. For countries, which never experienced a civil war, we measure the peace period since the end of World War II until 1962 (172 months) and add 60 peace months in each consecutive five-year period.
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy
Takes the value of one for the following countries: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina 
Variables added by Sørli that are relevant to our analysis:
Minimum democracy and transition
